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ATTORNEY MISAPPROPRIATION OF CLIENTS' FUNDS:
A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY*

Attorneys hold money belonging to their clients in many contexts: settlement monies from lawsuits, funds collected by the
attorney on behalf of his clients, real estate deposits held in escrow, fines to be paid on the clients' behalf, advances for costs,
and pre-paid legal fees for specific services yet to be performed by
the attorney. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9- 102 of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility 1 requires that any funds belonging to a
client2 should be maintained in a separate bank account apart from
monies belonging to a lawyer or his firm. 3 DR 9-102 also requires
that the attorney maintain complete records of all the clients'
funds, render an accounting to clients as to their funds, and·
promptly pay clients all funds in the lawyer's possession which are
due to them. 4

·

• The author wishes to acknowledge the information and helpful criticism provided· by
Robert Anderson, James H. Bradner, Jr. and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline,
Edmund N. Carpenter II, Norman A. Faulkner, John H. Neiman, and Eric H. Steele.
1
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules organized under nine Canons. The Canons express general concepts from
which the more specific Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived. Ethical
Considerations are "aspirational in character and represent objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive." The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, are "mandatory in character ... [and] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).
The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the
ABA on August 12, 1969, and became effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970.
Forty-seven states have adopted the Code by court rule. Telephone interview with E.
Russell Twist, Director of the Department of Professional Standards, ABA (Mar. 21, 1977). ·
2
DR 9-102(A) does not require that advances paid by clients for future costs or expenses
be maintained in a separate client trust account. One commentator has suggested that the
rule is ambiguous as to whether prepaid legal fees for specified services, as distinguished
from retainers paid merely to insure the availability of the attorney's services if needed,
must be treated as clients' money prior to performance of the legal services. Carpenter, The
Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Delaware's Solution, 61 A.B.A.J. 338, 340 (1975).
3
-ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(A):
Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs
and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the
lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(I) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the
lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or
law firm to receive.it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
4
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8).
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Breaches of professional duties in handling clients' funds account for a large share of the disciplinary penalties imposed on
attorneys 5 and occur in a variety of circumstances. The failure to
establish a separate bank account for clients' funds and the resulting commingling of a lawyer's funds with those of his client constitute a sufficient ground for discipline, although such a violation of
DR 9-102 is not necessarily an indication of illegal intentions or the
antecedent to later defalcations. 6 Frequently, commingling is combined with inadequate bookkeeping, which precludes the attorney
from determining whether he is spending his own money or that of
his clients. 7 The consequence is often defalcation, which began as
careless and unintentional misappropriation but evolved into embezzlement as the "borrowing" continued and increased in
amount. 8 Lawyers occasionally "borrow" from clients' funds to
cover their own expenses even where a separate client trust account is maintained. 9 Such illegal borrowing frequently involves
the attorney in a "web of financ.ial difficulties" that may culminate

5
In Wisconsin, for example, almost 40 percent of the attorney discipline cases brought
before the supreme court between 1957 and 1974 involved misappropriation or commingling
of funds held for clients. Memorandum in support of motion, In the Matter of a Supreme
Court Rule Requiring Periodic Reports by Attorneys to the State Bar of Wisconsin as to
Compliance with the Clients' Trust Funds Account Rule, at 2 (Sept. 29,' 1976). Approximately 32 percent of the disciplinary cases adjudicated by New Yorlc courts between J929 and
1962 involved commingling and conversion of clients' money. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 154 (1966).
6
Once the clients' funds have been commingled with those of the attorney, there is an
increased danger that the clients' money will be used for the attorney's personal expenses or
subjected to the claims of his creditors. "The rule against commingling was adopted to
provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger
in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of the clients' money." Black v.
State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1962).
Furthermore, the failure of the lawyer to separate his personal funds from those of his clients
gives the appearance of impropriety and reduces public confidence in the legal system and
profession. Accordingly, commingling must be discouraged even in circumstances where it
involves little risk of defalcation. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-5.
See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. White, 209 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa
1973); In re Windsor, 231 Or. 349, 373 P.2d 612 (1962); In re White, 24 N.J. 521, 132 A.2d 777
(1957).
7
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Loveland, 249 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1971); In re Banner, 31 N.J. 24,
155 A.2d 81 (1959); Clarie v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161, 246 P.2d I (1952).
8 See note 145 and accompanying text infra. The chairman of a committee appointed by
th.e Delaware Supreme Court to study and make recommendations regarding the accountability of attorneys for clients' funds concluded:
A thread that appeared to run through most, if not all, of the problem was the
apparent commingling by the attorney· of his own funds with those of his clients.
Attorneys initially may have felt that they were spending their own funds, though in
fact clients' funds were being diverted for personal purposes. At some point mere
negligence became blatant embezzlement.
Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338.
9 See, e.g., State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961), where the misappropriations were
precipitated when the attorney overextended himself in speculative business investments at
a time when he was suffering severe mental pressures and personal domestic problems.
Despite the mitigating circumstances, the attorney's subsequent repentance and rehabilitation, and his. re_stitution of 1111 funds owed, the Court suspended the attorney for six months.

SPRING

1977)

Attorney

& Clients'

Funds

417

in substantial defalcations involving the funds of many clients. 10
Unfortunately, other cases of defalcation involve attorneys who
have deliberately stolen from their clients . 11
The legal profession's response to the problem of attorney misappropriations traditionally has been limited to establishing and
enforcing standards for admission to and expulsion from the bar. 12
Recently, however, the profession has expanded its efforts beyond
merely regulating membership in the bar. Since 1959, almost every
state 13 has established a clients' security fund, either by the promulgation of court rules 14 or through the actions of state bar associations, 15 in order to compensate aggrieved clients. Subject to
maximum dollar limitations for any single award, 16 the funds reimburse defrauded clients presenting eligible claims. 1 7
The legal profession has initiated disciplinary processes and
clients' security funds in order _to achieve certain objectives. This

10 In re Baron, 25 N.J. 445, 449, 136 A.2d 873, 875 (1957).
The testimony of a state bar association president noted in the Clark Report suggests that
attorney misappropriation is usually part of a course of conduct and is not an isolated
incident. which is unlikely to be repeated. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT [the CLARK COMMITTEE], PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (final draft June 1970) at 18 [hereinafter dted
as the CLARK REPORT].
11
See, e.g., State v. Inglis; 160 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1964); State v. Hoffman, 157 So. 2d 137
(Fla. 1963).
12 These efforts have usually focused on the expulsion of dishonest members. See notes
19-25 and accompanying text infra. Efforts to prevent the admission of dishonest persons to
the bar have been minimal.
The bar also attempts to screen out potentially immoral or unethical practitioners in
the process of admission to the bar. However, examination into the moral character of the applicant is uniformly of a limited and routine nature, except for those
suspected of political nonconformity .... Only a very small fraction of applicants
are rejected on character grounds.
J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 162 n.l.
.
A few courts exercising their jurisdiction over the attorney as an officer of the court have
attempted to aid defrauded clients by entertaining summary proceedings against the offending attorney. These courts have directed the attorney to pay money owed to his clients,
attached the attorney's property to cover the debt, or punished· the attorney by fine or
imprisonment. Permitting such summary proceedings is a matter of judicial discretion, and
clients have no absolute right to invoke this summary remedy. In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 40
N.E.2d 247 (1942); Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 46 N.W.2d 187 (1951).
13 Other than North Carolina, which lias plans to establish a fund, only Utah and Wisconsin have not established clients' security funds. ABA STANDING CoMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS'
SECURITY FUND, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES I (Aug. 1976). Funds have also
been established in a number of foreign countries, and also in eight Canadian provinces.
Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 759 (1969). ·
1 • Nine of the 29 state funds responding to an AHA-sponsored questionnaire were created
by court rule or statute. ABA STANDING COMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND &
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT OF THE SURVEY
oF CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, 1972-1974 [hereinafter cited as CSF SURVEY], schedule C,
col. 2 I. Afterthe accuracy of the pre-publication draft has been verified, a final draft of the
Survey will be published in the near future.
15
Twenty of the 29 state funds responding were established by state bar associations,
CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 21.
·
16
See notes 87-93 and accompanying text infra.
17
See notes 69-86 and accompanying text infra.
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article will delineate these objectives and evaluate whether they
have been satisfied. Moreover, it will propose additional goals that
the legal profession, given its present status as a self-regulating
profession, should attain in satisfying its responsibility for governing the professional conduct of its members. Finally, additional
measures that several states have instituted in order to complement
the efforts of disciplinary agencies and clients' security funds by
fulfilling unsatisfied needs of profossionai responsibiiiiy wiii be
examined. 18

I.

EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

A. The Functions of Discipline and the

Disciplinary Agencies
The legal professional has traditionally limited its post-admission
efforts at self-regulation to disciplining attorneys who have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility .19 Based upon the
inherent judicial authority to regulate the conduct of officers of the
court, the judiciary generally-exercises the power to discipline
errant attorneys, although the legislature may also .employ this
power. 20 In most states, the courts have delegated the authority to
process complaints, conduct investigations, and hold evidentiary
hearings to bar associations, while retaining ultimate control over
the imposition of disciplinary penalties. 21 Although private reprimands and public censures have been used increasingly, the traditional sanctions for attorney misconduct have been suspension for
a specific period of time or disbarment with the possibility of
subsequent reinstatement. 22 The courts have usually employed
disbarment and suspension as sanctions, because the primary goal
of professional discipline is to remove unworthy members from the
18
These additional measures include minimum bookkeeping and accounting requirements, filing of an annual certificate by each attorney that outlines efforts to comply with the
disciplinary rules regarding client trust accounts, and limited audits or "compliance checks"
of the attorney's books and records. See notes 118-184 and accompanying text infra.
'" Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917, 926 (1976).
20 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. f/J7, 180 N.E. 725 (1932), the court held:
It is an inherent power of [the judicial branch of the government] ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character.
Id. at 609-10, 180 N.E. at 727. See generally CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-18.
21
Arkin, Self-Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standards of Professional
Integrity, 30 u. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 807-08 (1976).
22
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 924-25; Comment, Discipline of Attorneys in
Maryland, 35 Mo. L. REV. 236, 248 (1975).
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bar. 23 Punishment of the individual attorney has generally been
disavowed as an objective of professional discipline. 24 Rather,
disbarment and suspension are usually justified on the ground that
they are the only effective means of protecting the public from
dishonest attorneys and preserving the legal profession's reputation for honesty and trustworthiness. 25
The risk of future misconduct and injury to clients would increase if the punishment of offending attorneys was such as to
allow them to continue practicing law. First, it would be difficult to
monitor the performance of an attorney who has once violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility in order to guard against repeated misconduct. 26 The intricate and specialized nature of legal
work usually prevents clients from intelligently evaluating an attorney's performance. 27 Yet the complexity of legal work, the
discretionary latitude that is inherent in the delivery of professional
services, 28 and the requirements of confidentiality regarding the
affairs of clients probably preclude the effective regulation of attorney conduct by anyone other than the client. In view of these
constraints, the most effective method of insuring that an offending
attorney will not violate the professional code of conduct again is
to remove him from the profession. 29

23
E.g.., In testimony before the Clark Committee, a state supreme court justice stated,
"[t]he essential purpose of the grievance committee is to remove from the practice of law
attorneys who might harm the public and the courts." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 98.
See also Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 925-929.
An attorney charged with champerty or excessive advertising probably does not merit
disbarment or suspension. When an attorney misappropriates client funds, however, the
misconduct strikes at the heart of the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his
client and should be viewed as one of the gravest forms of misconduct, warranting expulsion. State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961); Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307
A.2d 677 (1973). See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
24
Comment, The Objectives of Attorney Discipline: A Pennsylvania View, 79 D1cK. L.
REv. 558, 561 (1975).
The Supreme Court has observed, "The proceeding [removal of an attorney as an officer
of the court] is not for the purpose of punishment, but for the pupose of preserving the courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." Ex parte Wall,
107 U .s. 265, 288 (1882).
25
In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d 935 (1943). Some courts view discipline as a
means of "vindicating the court's dignity," because an attorney has "brought contempt
upon the administration of justice." See, e.g., In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 454, 40 N .E.2d 247,
249 (1942). Other courts, however, describe their disciplinary functions as being for "the
welfare of the public, which is always a silent litigant in matters of this type." State v.
Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1961).
26
Some courts consider a violation to be conclusive evidence of a flaw in the attorney's
"character" that disqualifies him from further service as an attorney. See, e.g., People v.
Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 251, 124 N.E. 807, 811 (1919).
27
Leach, The New Look in Disciplinary Enforcement in England, 61 A.B.A.J. 212, 214
(I 975).
28
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1002.
29
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, "There is only one discipline for such a
man for the protection of other possible clients, and that is to put it out of his power to
misuse his position as a member of the bar, by disbarring him from further practice."
Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 563, 167 A .. 579, 583 (1933).
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The limited capacity of the bar to oversee attorney conduct also
diminishes the deterrent effect of sanctions that are imposed for
misconduct. Since discovery of a violation of the professional code
of ethics is uncertain or unlikely, 30 severe sanctions must be imposed on the relatively few offending attorneys who are discovered
in order to deter other attorneys. Thus, while the imposition of a
less severe punishment than disbarment may be fair with respect to
the individual offending attorney, it may not serve the broader
interests of the public and the profession in deterring misconduct
by other attorneys.
Given the importance of effective professional self-regulation in
preserving public faith in the integrity of the administration of
justice 31 and maintaining the legal profession's reputation for
trustworthiness, 32 disbarment is also justified in cases of attorney
misconduct that involve willful disregard or betrayal of the client's
interests. 33 The Code of Professional Responsibility states that the
loss of the respect and the confidence of society and of the members of the legal profession is the "ultimate sanction" for unethical
conduct. 34 An attorney who betrays his clients' interests, however,
indicates that he has inadequate concern for this ''ultimate sanction." Thus, even if a lesser penalty than disbarment might reform
the attitudes of an offending attorney and instill in _him a proper
respect for his professional obligations, his removal from the profession is necessary to facilitate the restoration of public confidence in the bar. 35
In attorney defalcation cases, however, the profession may impose lesser penalties in .order to attain a second goal, which is the
protection of the financial interests of the aggrieved clients. The
30
Based on a survey of the New York City bar, one commentator concluded, "[v]ery few
violators are caught and punished by the formal disciplinary machinery of the bar. We
estimate that only about 2 percent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted ethical
norms are processed, and fewer than 0.2 percent are officially sanctioned." J. CARLIN,
supra note 5, at 170. See also Comment, supra note 24, at 582.
31
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-1.
32
See Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 564, 167 A. 579, 583 (1933).
33
Misappropriation or misuse of a client's funds clearly falls within this class of professional misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340,255 N.W. 32 (1934); People v.
Simmons, 341 Ill. 340, 173 N.E. 398 (1930); People v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807
(1919).
34
ABA CooE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble.
35
See, e.g., In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 317, 91 A. 494 (1914), where the court
concluded that when an attorney was convicted of conspiring to conceal- assets from a
trustee in bankruptcy, disbarment necessarily followed:
The disbarment that followed was not punitive, but protective simply. Courts can
command public confidence only as those who serve therein are themselves observant of the law which it is the duty of the courts to enforce. In his high office, the
attorney-at-law is a minister of justice; he ceases so to be when, whether in the line
of his professional work or outside of it, he prostitutes his knowledge of the law and
the skill he has acquired therein to thwart the law by deceit and falsehood.
Id. at 495.
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disbarment of a misappropriating attorn_ey may substantially impair
his ability to earn an income so that it will be more difficult for his
clients to enforce judgments forconversion. 36 On the other hand, if
the disciplinary agency moderates the penalties imposed for defalcation on the condition that the_ attorney reimburses his clients, the
offending attorney is given an incentive to make restitution. Some
court.s arid disciplinary agencies, influenced by these consid~rations37 and by the fact that the client has not suffered permanent ·
injury if restitution is made, 38 are willing to impose lesser penalties
for defalcation. 39 Yet to the extent that attorn·ey misconduct ·is
treated as a private dispute between the attorney and his clients,
the, efforts of the legal profession to preserve its integrity and to
protect the general public may be substantially undercut. 40
The conflict between the goals of purging the profession of
dishonest attorneys and securing restitution for defrauded clients is
reflected in the responses of clients whose funds have been misappropriated. Clients understand the, professional standard of conduct concerning attorney defalcations because it corresonds to
general criminal standards of theft. Clients may also be able to
determine when the standard has been violated, since the resulting
loss involves a specific amount of money rather than a relatively
uncertain claim of legal rights. Although these considerations
suggest that client complaints of misappropriation are more likely
than other complaints to be brought to the attention of disciplinary·
agencies/ 1 some attorneys guilty of misappropriating clients'
funds are never disciplined. 42
36

See note 106 infra.
See CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 99.
38
See, e.g., In re Reed, No. 97 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1977). Citing the.fact of the attorney's full
restitution, the court limited discipline to a public censure and a $5000 fine, even though the
attorney had not previously attempted to make up the shortage in the four years following
his initial misappropriation. See also In re Saba, 253 N.Y.S.2d 323, 22App. _Div. 2d 14
(1%4).
39
One commentator-has suggested that most conversion cases in which restitution is
made following a complaint to a disciplinary agency rarely result in disbarment. If disbarment occurs, a reinstatement in seve_ral years is often the ultimate disposition. Letter from
Michael Franck, Executive Director .of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author (Jan. 24,
I 977). (This letter and all other letters quoted in the article are on file in the offices of the
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM.
40
By withholding discipline when restitution is maik the ethical standards of the profession are not maintained and the confidence of the public is diminished. The offending
attorney may misappropriate the funds of other clients, perhaps without further detection.
The minimal risks involved in unsuccessful attempts at conversion fail to provide an
effective deterrent to attorney defalcations. CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 98.
41
The factors which cause a client to lodge a complai11t are crucial, because investigations
of an attorney's conduct seldom occur without a client complaint. Other lawyers and judges
rarely lodge complaints against their colleagues. Furthermore, disciplinary agencies gener. ally lack the authority or the desire to investigate attorney behavior in the absence of a client
complaint. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: ls It Se[fRegulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 206-07 (1974).
42 Although disciplinary agencies may reduce the penalties imposed on defalcating attorneys, the agencies generally are not responsible for the fact that some attorneys complete_ly
37
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In ord~r to maximize the opportunity for restitution, the aggrieved client or an attorney subsequently retained to represent the
client may seek a private settlement with the offending attorney
rather than a filing of a disciplinary charge. 43 Even where there is
the possibility of an award from a client's security fund, the client
may still seek a private settlement. The criteria which claimants
must satisfy before becoming eligible for a fund award 44 may
substantially delay or completely deny an award to the ciient. For
example, many funds require that an attorney be disciplined by the
bar before an award may be made to the victimized client, 45 and
this requirement may subject the client to an unacceptably timeconsuming series of disciplinary proceedings. 46 If the client is
eligible for a clients' security fund award, the maximum dollar
limitations on the award of many funds 47 may result in less than full
reimbursement of his losses. Consequently, even a claimant eligible for an award may decide to pursue a private settlement.
The decision of clients to seek private settlements rather than to
file complaints in cases of attorney defalcation weakens professional discipline by failing to prevent or deter the misappropriating
attorney from engaging in further embezzlements. 48 Moreover, the
pressure on the attorney to make restitution to a client in order to
avoid disciplinary penalties may jeopardize the monies of other
clients of the attorney. 49 Private settlements thus clearly undermine the profession's efforts to discipline defalcating attorneys. In
the absence of an alternative means by which clients can receive

escape sanction. Disciplinary personnel accord a high degree of credibility to client complaints alleging misappropriation. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 41, at 206-07. As a result,
defalcation complaints are more likely to survive the initial screening by disciplinary agencies which results in the summary rejection of as many as 90 percent of all client complaints.
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 982.
43
CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 169. Attorneys retained by clients seeking restitution
from a defalcating attorney must promptly report the offending attorney's misconduct. "A
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of a Disciplinary Rule shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR l-103(A).
44
See notes 69-86 and· accompanying text infra.
45
See notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
46 John W. Bryan, a past chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security
Fund, has estimated that the usual delay between the filing of the complaint and the
conclusion of the disciplinary process is from one to three years. Bryan, supra note 13, at
757. As the Clark Report recognized, the delay between the receipt of a complaint and the
entry of a court order imposing discipline is a significant problem in disciplinary enforcement. The delay is attributable to the backlog of cases, the haphazard scheduling, and the
numerous stages in the disciplinary procedure which "far exceed the requirements of due
process." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 30-38, See also Florida Bar v. Randolph, 238 So.
2d 635 (Fla. 1970), where disbarment proceedings did npt reach the court until seven years
after the initiation of the disciplinary process and over ten years from the dates of the earliest
alleged defalcations.
47
See notes 87-92 and accompanying text infra.
48
CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 168.
4" fd.
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substantial and prompt reimbursement, however, there may be
little prospect for avoiding such settlements, unless the defalcations which lead to settlements can be prevented.
B. Clients' Security Funds

The clients' security fund is a means by which the members of
the legal profession contribute their own monies to reimburse
clients injured by the dishonest actions of their lawyers. 50 Many
funds, financed by appropriations from general bar dues, receive
either a fixed annual contribution from the bar or an amount which
varies from year to year depending on the degree to which the fund
has been depleted by awards to clients. 51 Alternatively, other
funds are financed by fees assessed against each attorney which
are specifically designated for the clients' security fund and are in
addition to bar dues. 52
Trustees appointed by the court or the bar association administer
the funds' operations 53 and generally serve without compensation.54 The trustees are authorized to manage and invest the assets

50
Since 1970, New Jersey has authorized the payment of over $1,000,000 in ·claims.
Amster, Clients' Security Funds: The New Jersey-Story, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610; 1614 (1976).
Michigan has reimbursed approximately 75 claimants since 1969, providing over $370,000.
Letter from David 0. Haughey, Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar
of Michigan, to the author (Nov. 15, 1976).
51
Of the 34 funds responding, 17 funds received lump sum appropriations as needed, and
10 received appropriations regardless of need. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C,
cols. 19a-19d.
The Oregon fund, for example, is authorized to draw its money from transfers by the
board of governors of other state bar funds, annual payments of up to five dollars which the
board of governors may impose on each active member of the bar;investment income of the
fund, and claims recovered against the attorneys whose clients have been reimbursed by the
fund. OR. REv. STAT. § 9.635 (1975).
52
Of the 34 states responding, 8 funds are financed by the direct assessment of state
attorneys ·or bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols.
19a-19d.
In Delaware, for example, the amount levied against each attorney varies with the length
of time the attorney has been a member of the bar. For lawyers- who have been in the
Delaware Bar for ten or more years, the annual assessment is $100. However, once the fund
has accumulated net assets of over $100,000, the subsequent assessment for all members is
only $10. DEL. CT. R. 32A(5).
53
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(l)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121. l(b); Mo. CT. R. 1228(b)(2); N.J. CT. R.
l:28-1(a).
For example, the court-established Iowa fund is administered by a seven person commission, which is empowered to recommend rule changes to the court concerning attorney
defalcations and to assist the court in administering Iowa's program of compliance checks.
Two of the seven commissioners must be nonlawyers. IowA CT. R. 121. l(c).
54
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(2)(f); IowA CT. R. 121. l(f); Mo. CT. R. 1228(c)(6); N.J. CT. R.
I :28-l(e). Twenty-six of the thirty-five funds responding do not permit attorneys to receive a
fee for representing a client before the trustees. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C,
col. 16.
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of the furid, to evaluate the claims of aggrieved clients, to make
awards, to enforce claims for restitution arising by subrogation or
assignment, 55 to file written and financial reports, and to hire
consultants, legal counsel, and other employees. 56 Generally, the
trustees are vested with exclusive and unreviewable authority in
performing their primary task, which is to determine whether a
claim merits reimbursement, and if so, what is the proper amount
of reimbursement. 57
1. Debt of Honor-Two objectives or justifications are commonly
cited as the reason for creating clients' security funds. The first
objective is premised on the belief that the profession as a whole
owes defrauded clients a "debt of honor. " 58 The profession represents its members to the public as being "honorable, learned and
skilled," and "when this trust is betrayed, the profession as a
whole has a duty to rectify the wrong committed against a
client. " 59 The client has "relied upon the profession's collective
representation" 60 and the profession has an obligation to remedy
the losses stemming from such reliance. 61
Most commentators have contended that only full reimbursement of all clients' losses can totally repay the professional debt of
honor. 62 Therefore, in judging the success of existing ft!nds in
satisfying this objective, tlte extent to which the funds ~ave
55

See note 82 and accompanying text infra.

56

E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(3); IOWA CT. R. 12l.3(d); N.J. CT. R. 1:28-4,-5; WYO. CT. R.

22(3,4).
57
See, e.g., DEL. CT. R. 32(A)(7)(a); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(2); WYO. CT. R. 22(3). But see
Folly Farms I, Inc. v. Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund of the Bar of Md., No. 159 (Md.
Ct. App., filed Sept. 16, 1976), where the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed its amendment of the court rules governing the clients' security fund permitting claimants whose
claims have been denied by the trustees to appeal their decision to the court. The trustees
can be reversed by the court where the trustees' decision was arbitrary and capricious, was
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, was not within the
authority vested in the trustees, was made upon unlawful procedure, or was uriconstitutional
or otherwise illegal. MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2). See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
58
See generally Smith, The Clients' Security Fund: 'A Debt of Honor Owed by the
Profession', 44 A.B.A.J. 125 (1958); Voorhees, Clients' Security Fund in 196/: A Progress
Report, 47 A.B.A.J. 494 (1961). ,
59
Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where Does the Legal
Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 382, 385 (1967).
60 ld.
61
Some courts have justified the judiciary's responsibility for attorney discipline in
analogous terms, as an effort to prevent the detrimental reliance of clients on dishonest
attorneys which may have been encouraged by collective representations of professional
competence:
By admitting [an attorney to the bar] the court presents him to the public as worthy
of its confidence in all his professional duties and relations. If afterwards it comes
to the knowledge of the court that he has become unworthy it is its duty to
withdraw that endorsement, and thereby cease to ,hold him out to the public as
worthy of professional employment.
1n re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 121 (1880).
82
See, e.g., Amster, supra note 50, at 1613; Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund
Maintains Bar's lntegrity, 44 FLA. B.J. 130, 132 (1970). But see notes 93-97 and accompanying text infra.
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reached the goal of full reimbursement should serve as the primary
criterion. Three significant aspects of existing funds have limited
their ability to attain the objective of full reimbursement. 63
One aspect in which many funds are deficient is the failure to
publicize their activities. Since clients will present claims against a
fund only if they are aware of its existence, publicity about a fund
is essential. 64 Accordingly, some funds pursue an aggressive public
relations policy, publicizing the names of the clients whose claims
are satisfied, the name of the defalcating attorney, and the nature
of the misconduct involved. 65 Other funds, perhaps motivated by
the idea that publicity about lawer misconduct is a gratuitous and
misguided effort at self-exposure, 66 do not extensively publicize
their existence and activities. 67
The criteria that a claimant must satisfy to be eligible for an
award constitute a second limitation on the capacity of present
funds to provide full reimbursement. Particular justifications may
be cited to support each eligibility criterion, but the pertinent
inquiry in each case is whether the justifications outweigh the
consequences of the fund's inability to indemnify fully the injured
clients who cannot satisfy the eligibility criteria. 68
All clients' security funds limit their reimbursements to losses
attributable to intentional attorney misconduct and do not reimburse losses due to attorney negligence. 69 Nevertheless, it may be
63 The inadequacies of clients' security funds have caused several jurisdictions to consider mandatory bonding of all attorneys as an alternative to the funds. See. e.g., Carpenter,
supra note 2, at 338. Bonding has been almost universally rejected, however, primarily
because of its expense. Moreover, bonding would effectively transfer the power to determine which lawyers should practice law from the bar admissions committees and the courts
to the surety companies. Manahan, Lawyers Should be Audited, 59 A.B.A.J. 3% (1973).
64 There appears to be a positive correlation between public awareness of the fund and the
number of claimants. Letter from John W. Gould, Chairman, Oregon Client Security Fund,
to the author (Feb. 7, 1977).
65 Of the 34 state funds responding, 15 funds indicated that they publicized the activities of
their funds. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17. The publicity policy of the
Florida Bar, for example, is expressly aimed at encouraging all clients who have suffered
losses to apply for reimbursement. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the
Florida Bar, to the author (Jan. 31, 1977).
66 Outcault & Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: A
Progress Report, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 686 (1973); Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 130.
67 Of the 34 state funds responding, nineteen funds indicated that they do not engage in
any publicity. CSF SURVEY; supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17.
68 Two eligibility criteria require little discussion. Claims arising from misconduct that
occurred before the establishment of the fund are usually denied. E.g .. IowA CT. R.
I21.3(j)(l)(b); MD. CT. R.1228(i)(5). A few funds require that claims must be brought w_ithin
a relatively short period of limitations. Note, supra note 59, at 394.
69
While this limitation corresponds to the practice of funds in other common law countries, the Norwegian fund reimburses losses stemming from both malpractice and dishonesty. It has been argued that effective protection of clients requires either the creation of
funds with such expanded coverage or the institution of mandatory malpractice insurance.
Bryan, supra note 13, at 760; Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director,
ABA Center for Professional Discipline (Jan. 6, 1977). Since 1971, every practicing lawyer in
Ontario. Canada, has been required to participate in a compulsory errors and omissions
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difficult to distinguish between malpractice and intentional theftin
cases where the client has paid an advance fee for particular
services, 70 and the attorney subsequently performs few, if any,
services while retaining all or most of the money. A number of
funds reimburse a client where no services have been performed
and the advance fee has been kept by the attorney. 71 Partial performance of the services, however, may preclude reimbursement
from the clients' security fund for the losses, thus relegating the
client to procedures established by the bar to arbitrate fee disputes. 72
A few of the clients' security funds established by voluntary,
nonintegrated state bar associations independently of legislative or
court authorization have limited the scope of reimbursable losses
to claims involving attorneys who are members of the association. 73 These organizations justifiably question their obligation to
cover losses stemming from actions of nonmember attorneys
whose conduct cannot be effectively monitored by the association.
However, since one purpose of the funds is to protect the justifiable reliance of clients, such a limitation on awards is not entirely
appropriate. A client's reliance on the honesty of his attorney is
unlikely to be contingent upon whether the attorney is a member of
the state bar association. 74 Funds established by statute or court
rule can more equitably distribute the burden of underwriting
awards in states with voluntary, nonintegrated bars, because such
funds can draw on contributions from all attorneys in the state. 7 ~,
Another significant limitation on awards from the funds is that
the loss must have been suffered in transactions that occurred
within the "attorney-client" relationship. 76 For instance, the profession does not recognize any _obligation to \ndemnify losses at-

insurance program, which insures every attorney against claims for negligence. Manahan,
note 63, at 397.
70
Such payments of fees are to be distinguished from "retainers," which are paid to an
attorney to assure his availability for possible future employment and belong to the attorney
immediately upon payment.
71
Letter from John. H. Neiman, Chairman, Iowa Client Security and Attorney Disciplinary Commission, to other members of the Commission (Feb. 18, 1976).
72
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1011-13.
73
The bar associations of three states have established funds which provide awards only
for losses due to the illegal activities of bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note
14, at schedule C, cols. 7, 21.
74
The public is unlikely to distinguish between members and nonmembers of the state bar
associations. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758.
75
In Iowa, for example, the fund has been established by court rule and the court has
required a contribution from each attorney as a condition of maintaining the right to practice
law in the state. IowA CT. R 121.3(i)(I). Any attorney who fails to make timely payment of
the required assessment and has been served with a notice of delinquency is summarily
suspended. IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7).
76
See, e.g., Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, Art. XVII; OR. REV. STAT. § 9.625
(1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(6)) (1953).

supra
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tributable· to a lawyer when he has defaulted on a loan from a client
or has acted as a business partner or investment counselor for the
client, rather than as an attorney. Some funds also deny claims
resulting from an attorney's actions in his capacity as an executor,
trustee, guardian, or other kind of fiduciary, provided the attorney
was not acting in his professional capacity as a lawyer. 77
In contrast, the New Jersey fund bases its criteria for a compensable claim on a causal relationship; a loss is reimbursable
where the trustees of the fund find that it would not have occurred
"but for the fact that the dishonest attorney enjoyed an attorneyclient relationship with the claimant at the time of or prior to the
loss. " 78 In applying this standard, the trustees consider the disparity of bargaining power between attorney and client, their respective educational backgrounds and levels of business sophistication,
whether unusual trust and confidence was placed in the attorney
because of his status as an attorney, and whether the attorneyclient relatio'nship gave the dishonest lawyer access to information
about the client's financial affairs that would not ordinarily have
been available. 79 By focusing on the nature of the client's reliance
on the attorney instead of on whether the transaction was part of an
attorney-client relationship, the "but for" test more accurately
determines which client claims involve a professional debt of
honor.
Many clients' security funds require that a client exhaust his
legal remedies against an attorney before he is eligible for an
award. 80 The legal expenses involved in satisfying this requirement
may deter many clients from applying for an award. 81 Other funds
do not require that a client first sue to recover his money, but
require that a claimant enter a subrogation agreement with the
fund, assigning his rights against the defaulting attorney to the
77 Funds in six states do not permit recoveries for claims arising from an attorney's breach
of a fiduciary duty. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 9.
78 Amster, supra note 50, at 1613. The Ontario fund has adopted a similar standard with
respect to losses arising from a solicitor's dishonesty in a debtor-creditor relationship.
Address by Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., Joint Meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on
Clients' Security Fund and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Aug. 4, 1973).
In relaxing the attorney-client relationship requirement, the "but for" standard approximates the standard used by the courts in imposing disciplinary penalties or providing
summary remedies. A significant number of disciplinary sanctions are imposed for conduct
arising outside the attorney-client relationship, and courts have provided summary remedies
for victims of attorney defalcation even where a conventional attorney-client relationship
did not exist. See cases cited in Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 137, 46 N.W.2d 87, 90
(IQ51). Cf. note 12 supra (discussing the summary remedy).
79
Amster, supra note 50, at 1613.
80
Nineteen of the 38 funds responding require that a client exhaust all legal remedies
against his attorney before applying for an award from the fund. CSF SURVEY, supra note
14, at schedule C, col. 4.
81
In contrast, the summary judicial remedy of restitution against defalcating attorneys
avoids imposing this extra burden on defrauded clients. Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. Todd,
52 N.Y. 489, 493 (1873). See generally_ notes 12 and 78 supra.
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trustees. 82 Many funds also condition payment of awards on the
discipline or criminal conviction of the embezzling attorney. 83 This
requirement encourages clients and other attorneys to file early
reports of professional misconduct. 84 It also ensures that either a
court or a disciplinary agency will determine whether a client's
losses were caused by a lawyer's dishonest misconduct in his
capacity as an attorney, thereby saving the trustees from making
such a determination. Unfortunately, this requirement also subjects the claimant to a possibly prolonged delay until final court
action is completed, which may encourage him to seek a private
settlement instead of filing a complaint and applying for an
award. 85 This problem may be solved by authorizing the clients'
security fund to make an award prior to the conclusion of the
disciplinary process where the necessary facts have been determined or are uncontested. 86
In addition to inadequate publicity and restrictive criteria for
eligible claims, the dollar limitations on the awards of clients'
security funds also contribute to the failure of many funds to repay
in full the collective "debt of honor" of the profession. Many funds
have maximum dollar limitations for reimbursements. 87 The limitations of the New Jersey fund are among the most generous of any
fund: $15,000 for any individual claimant and a total of $200,000 for
claims stemming from the course of misconduct of any single
attorney. 88 In contrast, however, some funds limit their awards to
$5,000 perclaimant. 89 Since the trustees of most funds are invested
82
See, e.g., N .J. CT. R. I :28-3(e). The New Jersey fund has had limited success in
enforcing claims against attorneys:
The primary reason is that many of these individuals have not only been disbarred
but also have spent a term in prison and are not likely candidates for remunerative
employment on their release .... Efforts are being made to improve the collectibility of these claims, but the trustees are not sanguine in this area.
Amster, supra note 50, at 1613.
83
Twenty-six of the 38 funds responding require that the attorney be formally disciplined
before any award can be made to his clients. In 15 of the 29 jurisdictions responding,
conviction of a crime is sufficient grounds for permitting an award. CSF SURVEY, supra note
14, at schedule C, cols. 8, 12.
84
CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 191.
85
See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
86
Address by J. Stanley Mullin,- Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Virginia Bar Association (July 15, 1972).
N.J. CT. R. I:28-3(a)(2) provides:
If none of these events [professional discipline, criminal conviction] has occurred
or is likely to occur, an ethics committee certifies a claim to the trustees as an
appropriate matter for their consideration .... Where an ethics committee does
not act and an attorney cannot be located, is deceased or incapacitated, the trustee
may consider timely application directly provided that the trustees find that the
claim is an appropriate matter for their consideration.
87
Twenty-two of the 40 funds responding place maximum dollar limitations on their
1wards. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols. 23, 24.
88
Amster, supra note 50, at 1612.
89
Six of the 40 funds responding have a maximum dollar limitation of $5000 or less per
claimant. CSF SURVEY, stipra note 14, at schedule C, col. 23.
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with the power, which they exercise "at their sole discretion," to
determine the amount of each reimbursement, 90 the trustees may
make awards in excess of the dollar limitations. On the other hand,
the trustees' discretionary powers are seemingly sufficient to permit an award which does not fully reimburse a client's losses, even
though the losses are within the dollar limitations. 91 The client
probably has no recourse in such a case because clients' security
fund awards are usually made as a matter of grace and not as a
matter of right. 92
Several explanations have been advanced in support of the discretionary powers and the dollar limitations on awards to eligible
claimants. Provisions for trustee discretion have been justified by
the unavailability of statistical data concerning attorney defalcations, which prevents the trustees from accurately estimating the
volume and magnitude of future claims and requires the trustees to
exercise restraint in making awards. 93 It has also been argued that
the dollar limitations of clients' security funds are analogous to the
maximum awards payable by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to depositors. 94 The limitations on both FDIC and clients'
security fund awards may escape criticism because the small client
or depositor, for whom a loss in an amount that is within the
limitations would be catastrophic, is fully reimbursed. 95 Dollar
limitations are also defended as temporary provisions to protect
fledgling funds from being "bankrupted" by large claims during
their initial years of existence. 96
All of these justifications for providing less than full indemnification have merit, yet it can be argued that the real reason for dollar
limitations and discretionary powers is the bar's reluctance to pay
the money necessary to reimburse all eligible claimants. The ABA
Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has recently re-

90
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(a); IowA CT. R. 12l.3(j)(2); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(I); N.M.
STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(a)) (1953).
91
The trustees of many funds are either encouraged or required to consider several
factors in determining the amount of an award: the degree of hardship suffered by the client,
the negligence of the client, if any, which may have contributed to the loss, and the amounts
available to the fund for payment of awards and the number and size of eligible claims that
have been or may be presented. It would seem that any one of these factors might serve as a
justification for limiting an award to an amount less than the loss suffered.
92
E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(j)(4); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2); N.J. CT.
R. I :28-3(d). But see note 57 and accompanying text supra.
·
·
93
Mullin, Clients' Security Funds: Where We Are, What's Ahead, BAR EXECUTIVE KEY
HANDBOOK (Mar. 1972).
94
Smith, supra note 58, at 128. Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing
Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971).
95
Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director of the ABA Center for
Professional Discipline (Jan. 6. 1977).
96
Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971).
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ported that the majority of funds are either inactive or ineffective. 97
The inactivity or ineffectiveness of these funds stems largely from
inadequate financing, which has apparently been a principal problem with the funds since their inception. In 1961, the chairman of
the ABA Standing Committee noted that the profession had accepted the obligation to repay a debt of honor, and that "the only
one real hurdle" which the funds faced was "the matter of dollars
and cents. " 98 The chairman found an "unwiiiingness io appropriate money out of the state bar treasury, resistance to an increase in
association dues," and apprehension that the clients' security fund
would lead to "the bankruptcy of the state Bar. " 99
The reluctance of attorneys to underwrite the limited awards of
existing funds suggests that they may not accept the added financial cost of a program of full reimbursement. Since some funds
presently require substantial contributions from every attorney in
the state, perhaps attorneys should not be required to shoulder this
additional burden alone . 100 One alternative source of funding besides the contributions of attorneys is the interest which might be
derived from client trust accounts. Few, if any, attorneys presently
maintain their trust funds in interest bearing accounts, but instead
place the money in noninterest bearing demand accounts. 101 Attorneys themselves may not keep the interest earned on funds held
in trust, 102 and the high turnover of the numerous deposits in any
one account makes the proration of the interest earned among
clients economically infeasible and often physically impossible. 103
Florida is now considering a program, similar to those in operation
in Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which would permit banks
to pay interest earned on trust fund deposits to finance clients'
security fund awards. 104 Of course, while such a program might
permit full reimbursement of client losses, it may be questioned
whether clients should be asked to help pay the profession's debt
of honor.

97 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, REPORT TO THE ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 1976).
98 Voorhees, supra note 58, at 494-95.
99 Id. at 495. See also Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 130.
100 Most attorneys in New Jersey are assessed fifty dollars a year to support the state clients'
security fund. N .J. CT. R 1:28-2. Delaware and Iowa attorneys who have been in practice for a
number of years must pay one hundred dollars annually until the assets of the fund reach a
specified amount, after which the assessment drops to ten dollars per year. DEL. CT. R.
32A(5); IowA CT. R 121.3(i).
101 Florida Bar News, Dec. 1976, at 6.
102 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS
545, 991 (May 5, 1962), (July 3, 1967).
103 Brief of the Florida Bar in Support of Petition for Amendment of Integration Rule and
Code of Professional Responsibility to Provide for Voluntary Attorney Participation in a
Supplemental Clients' Security Fund Program at 12 (Mar. 11, 1977).
10
• Id.; Florida Bar News, Mar. 10, 1977, at 4.
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2. Preserving the Privilege of Self-Regulation-The second goal
of clients' security funds is based upon the expectations of clients
and the general public that arise not from the representations of the
bar, but from the self-regulating nature of the profession.
The public looks to the profession to keep its own house in
order and when a lawyer embezzles his clients' funds the whole
bar is blackened in the public eye. The rest of us, as well as the
embezzler, are considered at fault because we have failed to
police our own ranks and to prevent the defalcation. 105

This second justification presumes that the public will view the
suspension or disbarment of an offending.attorney after a defalcation has occurred as an inadequate response by the profession
because these sanctions do not refund the client's money, and the
losses of the individual client are seldom reimbursed by the defalcating attorney . 106 Accordingly, the bar perceives the clients' security fund as a means of accommodating the public demand for
accountability, while quelling public dissatisfaction and preserving
the freedom of the legal profession to regulate itself without public
intervention . 107
It is not clear whether clients' security funds have actually
helped to minimize public dissatisfaction with the legal profession's self-regulation. 108 One reason may be the imperfect public
understanding that the funds are largely a voluntary undertaking of
attorneys who have no binding obligation to provide reimbursement. It has been argued that the public appreciates the gratuitous
nature of the fund and understands why losses may not be reimbursed in full. 109 Nonetheless, some victimized clients resent the

lOS ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, Report 3 (Feb. 1959),
quoted in Note, supra note 59, at 384.
106 A former chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has
noted that "rarely, in the case of an attorney's misappropriation, is complete or partial
restitution made, and rarely is a civil judgment collectible." Address by J. Stanley Mullin,
Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Virginia Bar Association
(July 15, 1972).
107 One commentator has suggested that self-protection is a primary purpose of the funds.
"Although we have often called the clients' security fund a debt of honor, I truly believe that
the existing threat to our exclusive self-government makes a clients' security fund a necessary supplement to our existing disciplinary procedures." Address by J. Stanley Mullin,
Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association
(June 4, 1971). Another commentator has suggested that the disciplinary efforts .of the;
agencies of the bar are aimed at forestalling public criticism and control of the legal
profession. J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 161.
108 E.g .. Brian E. Toland, a past chairman of the Compensation Fund Committee of the
English Law Society, has stated that the client security fund "has done more than anything
else to enhance the prestige and honour of the profession." Smith, supra note 58, at 125.
E.g .. Edmund N. Carpenter II has reported that the Trustees of the Delaware Client Security
Fund "doubt if any- goodwill has been created by their client security fund." Address by
edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Workshop (Feb. 12, 1976).
10
• See,. e.g .. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758.
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eligibility limitations on awards and perceive the fund "as an
insurance company that is delaying in paying claims rather than a
voluntary fund supplied by other attorneys to minimize the bad
experience which they have received. " 110 In light of these conflicting reports, it is unclear whether the funds have enhanced public
goodwill toward the bar.
The publicity that is essential to a public understanding of the
contributions of the bar in establishing clients' security funds also
necessarily reveals the misconduct of attorneys. 111 Public cognizance of the commendable professional efforts at reimbursement
will be accompanied by a greater awareness of the extent of attorney defalcations. Accordingly, questions regarding the profession's capacity for self-regulation may be raised. As a result, publicity concerning awards to claimants might prove counterproductive by leading to public demands that attorney discipline be handled by some agency outside the legal profession.
The dilemma which confronts the profession's efforts to publicize clients' security funds evidences the fact that the funds
cannot substitute for an effective program of self-regulation . 112
Payments from such funds will neither deter the misconduct of
attorneys nor rid the profession of dishonest practitioners. The
funds can only complement the actions of the disciplinary agencies, remedying the injuries of clients that could not be prevented
by the bar's efforts at self-regulation. It is doubtful that attorneys
are willing to pay the high costs of a primarily remedial approach.113 Moreover, it is unlikely that public confidence can be
maintained through an essentially remedial approach to professional regulation.

II.

NEW GOALS AND PROCEDURES

Regardless of whether the present funds and disciplinary agencies have been successful in achieving their goals, the response of
the legal profession to the problem of attorney defalcations should
also be evaluated in terms of additional goals that the bar should
pursue in light of its responsibilities for professional self110
Address by Edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Fund Workshop (Feb.
12, 1976).
111
This predicament was noted by Douglas Sweet, the director of Research and Development for the Michigan State Bar. "The problem is that in a way we would like to
publicize the fund but in another way it carries a degree of negativism, almost like asking
people if they know any bad attorneys." Ann Arbor News, Oct. 27, 1976, at 7, col. I.
112
Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 132.
113
See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.
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regulation. In addition to reacting to cases of attorney misappropriation through disciplinary proceedings and clients' security fund
awards, the profession has a further obligation to the public and to
its members to prevent such misconduct.
To satisfy these additional responsibilities, a few states have
developed new instrumentalities, including bookkeeping and accounting requirements, 114 questionnaire and certificate requirements that provide evidence of attorney compliance with the Disciplinary Rules, 115 and periodic "compliance checks" that ascertain whether attorneys have complied with the bank account and
bookkeeping regulations. 116 These additional procedures are designed to complement, not to supersede, ·the disciplinary proceedings and the clients' security funds. In part, the new safeguards are
intended to enhance the deterrent value of existing disciplinary
penalties by increasing the likelihood that misappropriations by an
attorney will be discovered. More importantly, however, these
new procedures are designed to provide guidance to attorneys
regarding the best ways to handle and to account for the funds of
their clients.
A. Trust Account Recordkeeping Requirements

Disciplinary Rule 9-102(8)(3) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility requires attorneys to maintain "complete records of
all funds, securities and other properties of a client coming into the
possession of the lawyer." 117 Several states have elaborated upon
this terse statement by promulgating detailed descriptions of the
kinds of records and bookkeeping procedures that constitute
"complete records. " 118 In some states, the specified records and
114
115
116
117

See notes 117-47 and accompanying text infra ..
See notes 148-56 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 157-84 and accompanying text infra.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8)(3).
DEL. CT. R. 33(2) (adopting the DELAWARE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102, INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES No. 2 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
DELAWARE GUIDELINES); INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule I I .02(4)(c); IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, MANUAL ON AUDIT PROCEDURES; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2). A proposed court rule
ordering bookkeeping procedures is now before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Letter from
Carl E. Glock, Jr., to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
This article will also consider the recordkeeping rules established for Ontario and the lates•
working draft of guidelines prepared by the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security
Fund and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline entitled SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR
RULES FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF FUNDS, SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY
HELD FOR CLIENTS AND OTHERS BY LAWYERS (Nov. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE DRAFT).
In addition to providing record keeping and accounting requirements, many of these descriptions also elaborate on the requirement of DR 9-102(A) that clients' funds be deposited in "one
or more identifiable bank accounts," by specifying that the bank account must be clearly
118

434

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:415

procedures are only advisory, 119 whereas in other states the prescribed accounts and accounting procedures are mandatory . 120
Some of the latter states also stipulate that attorneys engaged in
practice as a partnership or professional corporation are collectively responsible for compliance with the rules to the extent that
they maintain their records on a group basis. 121 All state recordkeeping requirements indicate that the attorney must retain
the records for a specified iength of time_ uz Attorneys acting as
escrow agents, executors, guardians, trustees, conservators, or
receivers may be subject to additional accounting requirements
pursuant to state law or court rules. Preferable recordkeeping
requirements attempt to free such attorney-fiduciaries from duplicative, and possibly contradictory, accounting requirements .123

labeled as a "trust account" and must identify the attorney or partnership. E.g., ·wis. CT. R. §
256.293(1); COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § 1(8).
The Committee Draft also recommends that a separate fiduciary bank account be maintained for funds held by an attorney in his fiduciary capacity as an escrow agent, executor,
guardian, trustee, conseivator, or receiver. COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note I 18, at §
l(A)(l)(a). The recordkeeping directions for such funds require only that the bank account
be reconciled monthly and that a list of the funds in the account, the person for whom the·
funds are held, and the purpose for which the funds are being held be maintained. Id. at §
IV(B)(8).
The Delaware Guidelines and the proposed Pennsylvania rule also provide for a separate
fiduciary bank account for money held in escrow for real estate transactions which may be
maintained at the option of the attorney. A separate bank account and simpler accounting
procedures are appropriate because attorneys in this type of practice might be involved in a
relatively large number of transactions which would not· involve a continuing series of
disbursements and deposits for the same client. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the
author (Jan. 25, 1977).
119
E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. See also Carpenter, supra note 2, at
340.
120
E.g., INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule
I l.02(4)(c); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2).
121
E.g., COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § III(C); PRo"POSED PA. CT. R. §
81. IOI (2). The shared responsibility parallels the joint liability of lawyers engaged in a group
practice for the misappropriations of any one of the attorneys in the firm, despite their
personal innocence, based upon their status as partners or as co-trustees of the client trust
bank account. See Blackmon v. Hale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. App. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, I Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418 (1970).
122 The specified period of retention begins with the year to which the records relate,
except in the case of fiduciary records, where the retention period begins only after the
completion of the fiduciary obligation. DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 60 (five
years); IowA CT. R. 121.4(a)(3) (five years); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81.101 (2)(b) (seven
years); ONT. REG. 983/74, § 19(i)(2)(b) (five years). Since these records will be used
primarily by courts either to discipline an attorney or to provide the client with a summary
remedy for the attorney's conversion, it is not necessary to establish tiine limits with
reference to any statutes of limitation. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author
(Jan. 25, 1977). A "reasonable period" which conforms to state tax requirements for
business records for record preseivation may be established. Such a time period should
allow discovery of attorney-embezzlers before records are legitimately destroyed, and it
would not impose an additional or conflicting obligation upon attorneys. Letter from John
H. Nieman to the author (Feb. 10, 1977).
123
For example, Florida exempts attorneys from the general recordkeeping requirements
insofar as an attorney's handling of a client's funds is subject to an accounting rule imposed
by law or court rule. INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Act. XI, bylaws implementing Rule I l.02(4)(c). The Delaware Guidelines were also drafted with consideration for
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The Delaware Guidelines contain the most thorough and effective suggestions with respect to the records and computational
procedures that attorneys should use in accounting for clients'
funds. 124 Three basic records are recommended: a cash receipts
journal listing the source of each receipt and the date of the receipt;
a disbursements journal listing the date of each disbursement and
the payee; and a subsidiary ledger that contains a separate page for
each client for whom monies have been received in trust, showing
the dates and amounts of each receipt and disbursement and any
unexpended balance. 125 Using· these records, bank statements,
cancelled checks, and duplicate deposit slips, 126 attorneys are
urged to perform two accounting procedures on a monthly basis
and to retain a copy of their computations. First, a trial balance of
the subsidiary ledger which shows the name of the client and the
balance of the client's account as of the end of the month should be
calculated. 127 Without such a monthly balance it would be difficult
to review the accounts in the event of an audit. 128 Secondly, the
attorney should reconcile the cash balances indicated by the receipts and disbursements journal totals, the bank statement balance, and the subsidiary ledger balance .129 For property other than
cash, the Delaware Guidelines suggest only that some kind of
record be kept and that the property be specifically identified. 130
Furthermore, certain records and accounting procedures are
suggested for monies received by an attorney that belong to him or
existing statuto111 accounting re.quirements, so as to avoid duplication or conflict. Letter
from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
124
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note I 18. The Delaware Guidelines were the product
of a three-month effort by a committee of attorneys appointed by the Delaware Supreme
Court, which worked with a committee of certified public accountants in drafting the
accounting and bookkeeping suggestions. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338-39. The Iowa
Client Security and Attorney Discipline Commission has recommended the Delaware
Guidelines to its attorneys. IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, MANUAL ON AUDIT PROCEDURES 2 [hereinafter cited as IOWA AUDIT MANUAL].
The Committee Draft relies on the Delaware Guidelines in its recordkeeping requirements.
Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr. (Feb. 23, 1977).
125
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118.
126
Although the cancelled checks and duplicate deposit slips are listed separately in the
Guidelines from the receipts and disbursements journals, the chairman of the committee that
drafted the Guidelines has indicated that an attorney may maintain a file of cancelled checks
and deposit slips in lieu of these two journals. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the
author (Jan. 25, 1977).
127
DELAWARE Gu1DELINES, supra note I 18. The current balance shown in the subsidiary
ledger should agree with the control figure computed by taking the balance at the beipnning
of the month, adding the total of clients' money received for the month, and deductmg the
total disbursements for the month.
128
Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
129
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118.
130
Both the Committee Draft and the proposed Pennsylvania rules have additional requirements for securities and noncash property. Such property must be identified and labeled with
the name of the client, and the records of such property must be kept in a separate place from
where the property is held. PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81.102(b); COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note
118, at § ll(A).
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his firm. Specifically, the Delaware Guidelines suggest that attorneys keep a cash receipts journal, a cash disbursements journal, a
fees book or a file of billing invoices, and a copy of the bank
statements, cancelled checks, and deposit slips for the attorney's
nonclient bank account. 131 The Guidelines also recommend a
monthly reconciliation of the checkbook balance, the bank statement balance, and the cash balance derived from the cash receipts
and disbursements journal's totals. 132 Such records are essential if
an auditor has to separate commingled client funds and personal
monies of the attorney. 133 Moreover, the suggestions may assist
attorneys who have only rudimentary accounting skills.
One serious problem with the accounting rules of United States
jurisdictions is their failure to define precisely which funds should
be maintained in a separate client account and accounted for in
accordance with the bookkeeping requirements. DR 9-102(A), 134
which provides the definition of clients' trust funds, is ambiguous
as to. whether fees paid in advance for specific services yet to be
performed continue to belong to the client until the attorney performs the services. 135 In addition, the Disciplinary Rule does not
require that advances for costs and expenses be placed in a trust
account and treated as clients' funds. 136 Yet if an attorney misappropriated such advances instead of applying them toward the
client's expenses, such a defalcation would provide an adequate
basis for discipline and a clients' security fund award. In effect, DR
9-102 permits the commingling of advances for costs and expenses,
but then punishes the defalcations which may result from such
commingling. DR 9-102 also fails to specify that the interest earned
by the funds in a client trust account belongs to the attorney's
clients and not to the attorney .137 Since the rules do not mention
how interest is to be accounted for, attorneys may innocently
misappropriate interest that is earned by clients' funds. There is

131

DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118.
/d.
133
Letter from Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor for the Law Society of Upper Canada, to
the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
134
See note 3 supra.
135
See note 2 supra. The Professional Ethics Committee of The Florida B~r, in interpreting DR 9-I02(A), has recently decided that such payments will be presumed to be intended
by the client as the property of the attorney upon his receipt of the funds, unless there is
evidence that the prepayment was intended and was designated as a "fee security" deposit.
FLORIDA BAR COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ADVISORY OPINION No. 76-77, published
in Florida Bar News, Jan. 20, 1977, at 5, col. I. In Iowa, however, the Client Security and
Attorney Disciplinary Commission has decided that such prepayments should be retained in
trust accounts until earned. NEWS BULL. OF THE low A ST. B. Ass'N, (Aug.-Sept. 1975).
136
See note 3 supra. It is unclear whether DR 9-102(A) precludes the possibility of
treating advances for costs and expenses as clients' trust funds or merely fails to require
such treatment.
137
See note 3 supra.
132
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also a real question as to whether the attorney has a fiduciary
obligation to place his clients' funds in an interest bearing account
rather than allow them to lie dormant in a noninterest bearing
demand account. 138
The accounting rules for lawyers in the Canadian province of
Ontario, 139 though similar to many of the aforementioned aspects
of the Delaware Guidelines, are more successful in delineating
which funds must be handled as trust funds. The Ontario definition
of "client's trust funds" explicitly requires that advances for costs
and fees for services not yet rendered must be maintained in a
client trust account. 140 There is also no confusion as to interest
earned on clients' funds, because Ontario expressly requires attorneys to hold clients' money in an interest bearing account and to
pay the interest to the Law Foundation of Ontario, which uses the
proceeds to fund legal education and research, legal aid programs,
and law libraries. 141
A second serious problem with United States accounting rules is
their failure to specify which monies must be placed in a client trust
account, which monies may be placed in such an account, and
which funds may not be deposited in a client trust account. The
Ontario bookkeeping rules, in contrast, clearly delineate which
funds fall into each of these three categories . 142 Some attorneys
may view regulations or suggestions regarding the making of deposits and withdrawals as unnecessary restrictions. The clear definition of the scope of an attorney's duties and discretion provided
by such rules, however, is for the guidance as well as the supervision of attorneys, and may be more helpful than coercive.
Despite the variations in the recordkeeping guidelines and requirements of different jurisdictions, the policies justifying the
procedures are similar. An ABA-sponsored report on professional
discipline advocated that attorneys should be required to keep
adequate records of clients' funds. 143 The Clark Report cited two
reasons for its recommendation: first, that a recordkeeping requirement would assist disciplinary investigations into complaints
of misappropriations, and second, that a combination of accounting rules and a program of annual audits would deter attorney
mishandling of funds. 144 In addition to effectuating the goals of
discipline and deterre~ce, however, recordkeeping rules are de-

138
139
140
141
142

143
144

Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
ONT. REG. 983/74, §§ 17-20 (The Law Society Act) (1974).
Id. § 18(3).
Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, ch. 238, § 5J(f).
ONT. REG. 983/74, § 18(4-8), (The Law Society Act) (1974).
See CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 173.
Id.
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signed to instruct and to guide honest attorneys. For example,
prescribed bookkeeping and accounting procedures may prevent
the negligent misappropriation that can occur when, as a result of
inadequate recordkeeping, the attorney negligently spends money
for personal purposes. 145 Furthermore, the existence of explicit
minimum requirements for recordkeeping, even where the discovery of misconduct is unlikely, confronts a disorganized attorney
with the fact that he is in violation of the Disciplinary Rules and
therefore may be subject to disciplinary action. Cognizance of his
noncompliance may induce the attorney to fulfill his responsibilities. Most importantly, guidelines which encompass more
than minimum requirements and provide comprehensive suggestions can perform a "channeling function." 146 The attorney who
seeks to comply with the requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is provided with a specific model and a standard of
conduct, rather than vague exhortations about character and honesty_ 141
B. Certificates of Compliance and Questionnaires

In addition to imposing recordkeeping requirements, several.
states require attorneys to file annual reports regarding their client
trust bank accounts. The simplest kind of trust account report
merely requires each practicing attorney 148 to file a statement
indicating that he has read and has substantially complied with the
145
It has been argued that misappropriating attorneys often did not begin with a fixed
intention to embezzle and were initially unaware of any impropriety as a consequence of
inadequate accounting or commingling. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338. However, some
commentators have insisted that the vast majority of attorney misappropriations are the
result of deliberate fraud. Letter from Charles 0. Fisher, Chairman, Clients' Security Trust
Fund of the Bar of Maryland, to the author (Feb. 3, 1977); Letter from David 0. Haughey,
Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author
(Nov. 15, 1976). The truth probably lies somewhere between these two observations. When
attorneys start using client's funds, they may intentionally allow their bookkeeping to
become inaccurate and incomplete so as to obscure or excuse their misappropriation.
Although bookkeeping requirements are useless as guides for dishonest attorneys, the
requirements may serve as the basis for disciplining such attorneys, who might otherwise
have avoided a stiff penalty for defalcation by claiming their inadequate records as an
excuse. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar, to the author
(Jan. 31, 1977).
146
Cf., Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (illustrating how
legal standards serve as guides and models, in addition to defining the minimum performance required to constitute compliance with mandatory rules).
147
The chairman of the committee which drafted the Delaware Guidelines noted: "We
suggested books and records ... [so] that those who wanted to be extra safe [could be surel
that by having these specific books and records they were certainly complying with the
Guideline." Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
148
Generally, judges or attorneys who are full-time employees of a government agency or
a business corporation are not required to file a report because they do not handle the funds
of individual clients. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.3(i)(4). Similarly, such attorneys are often either
exempted from an obligation to contribute to a clients' security fund or are allowed to make
a reduced payment. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.4(b)(l).
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rules regarding client trust accounts .149 Some states require that
every attorney or partnership submit answers to a questionnaire
which asks whether adequate records of clients' funds are maintained and whether a separate clients' trust bank account is
kept. 150 The questionnaire also requests the attorney to list the
banks where clients' accounts are maintained and to disclose the
name and number of such accounts. 151 If an attorney fails to submit
a certificate or to answer a questionnaire, he may risk summary
suspension from the bar. 152
In addition to requiring attorneys to file a combined certificate
a.rid questionnaire, Ontario requires that each attorney employ a
public accountant to examine the attorney's records. The accountant does not conduct an in-depth audit, but is only required to
ascertain whether the records on their face appear to comply with
the Ontario bookkeeping regulations . 153 The report of the accountant does not purport to be an audit. In fact, because the accountant
does not verify the accuracy of the records by contacting the
attorney's clients, inspect the files of the attorney apart from the
records that the attorney furnishes for his investigation, or check
on the sufficiency of internal controls, the report offers only
slightly more protection than the attorney's own certificate of
compliance. 154
The self-certifying nature of these provisions suggests that questionnaires and certificates of compliance are not designed primarily
to expose embezzling attorneys. The principal functions of these
requirements seem to be to notify attorneys of their professional
responsibilities and to encourage them to satisfy these duties.
Thus, the success of a certificate requirement in generating attorney compliance depends upon the expectation that most attorneys
will establish a separate bank account for clients' funds and will
149
E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA
BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule I 1.02(4)(c); N.M. Sur. CT. RULES GOVERNING
DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81. 103.
150 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2).
151
DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; low ACT. R. 121.4(b)(l). While New Mexico
does not require a listing of banks and account names and titles, it does require attorneys to
describe the actual records maintained for clients' funds in sufficient detail so that the
function of each record can be understood. Attorney's Certification of Records Form, as
authorized by N.M. SUP. CT. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b).
152 The Iowa rules, for example, provide for the summary suspension of any attorney who
fails to submit a questionnaire, provided that a notice of delinquency has been served upon
him thirty days prior to his suspension. IowA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7). Once suspended, the
attorney may be reinstated only upon a showing that his prior failure to comply was not
willful and that he has subsequently filed the questionnaire answers or certificate. low A CT.
R. 121.3(i)(9).
153 Form 3 Report, as authorized by ONT. REG. 983/74, § 20(2) (The Law Society Act)
(1974).
154
Telephone interview with Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor of the Law Society of
Upper Canada (Mar. 18, 1977).
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keep adequate records in order to be able to sign the certificate in
good faith. A questionnaire, on the other hand, does not rely
exclusively on the lawyer's conscience. When an attorney knows
that his noncompliance with the rules, particularly a failure to
maintain a separate client bank account, can be quickly detected, 155 he may be more likely to establish a separate account.
Accordingly, if a transfer out of a separate client trust account is
required before the attorney can spend the ciients' funds, inadvertent misappropriations resulting from lax accounting will be reduced, and intentional defalcations will be easier to identify . 156 By
deterring commingling, the certificate and the questionnaire requirements help solve a central problem of attorney defalcations.
C. Audits and Compliance Checks

A number of jurisdictions provide for the inspection of the client
trust bank accounts and the accounting records required by DR
9-102. 157 There are basically two kinds of inspections. The first
kind consists of comprehensive audits that are triggered by a credible client complaint or by other circumstances constituting good
cause. The Florida audit provision, for example, empowers the
appropriate disciplinary agency to order a complete audit if the
attorney has failed to file a certificate or questionnaire, or if a
check that he has drawn on his client trust account has been
returned for insufficient funds. 158 Other circumstances which
suggest possible misconduct are also sufficient to trigger an audit.159 For example, if an attorney fails to distribute funds for a
client, a broader investigation of his records would probably be
justified. The definition of the conditions constituting good cause
within the meaning of such rules is broad and general in order to
grant disciplinary authorities substantial discretion in their investigations.160
In a more comprehensive proposal, the Clark Report recommended that complete annual audits be required of every attorney
155
The questionnaire should include a written authorization to be signed by the attorney
that will permit disciplinary officials to inspect the bank accounts claimed by the attorney in
his answers to the questionnaire.
156
Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
157
See, e.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE
FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(b); low A CT. R. 12l.4(a); Mo. CT. R. BVIS; N.J. CT.
R. l:28-6(a); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2).
158
INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(a).
159
Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel of the Florida Bar, to the author
(Jan. 31, 1977).
160
According to the chairman of the Maryland Clients' Security Fund, the "good cause"
requirement was intentionally designed "to allow the disciplinary agencies to discover a
possible pattern of defalcation when only the tip of the iceberg is visible." Letter from
Charles 0. Fisher to the author (Feb. 3, 1977).
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regardless of any evidence of wrongdoing. 161 The committees
which drafted the Delaware and Pennsylvania guidelines considered requiring such annual audits for each attorney, but decided
not to recommend such a requirement. 162 Both committees found
that the cost would be excessive, especially for attorneys who,
prior to the promulgation of the accounting guidelines, maintained
few records. In Delaware, it would also have been difficult to find
enough accountants to undertake the work. 163
The second inspection mechanism is a "compliance check" that
involves a cursory examination of the client trust account records
in order to determine wheth~r the attorney is maintaining records
that satisfy the jurisdiction's bookkeeping requirements. Of the
two states with compliance check programs, Iowa has the more
successful and highly developed system. 164 The Iowa program
employs full-time accountants, rather than relying upon outside
public accountants, because full-time staff auditors are more effective in uncovering fraud and are less expensive. 165 Before conducting compliance checks ofa few attorneys in a particular county, a

CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 173·.
Letter from Carl E. Glock, Jr., Chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee which
drafted the 'proposed court rules, to Michael Franck (July 21, 1976). Carpenter, supra note 2,
at 339.
1s3 Id.
164
The Iowa program was established by court rule in late 1973. In 1974, its audits·were
confined to 29 attorneys against whom specific co~plaints had been-lodged. In 1975, the
auditors, who are employed by a special commission that the court created to administer the
client security fund and the audit program, completed regular audits and compliance checks
at over 542 law offices. The average estimated cost of each compliance check was between
25 and 50 dollars. Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Oct. 28, 1976); THE CLIENT
SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT.
The trustees of the Delaware Client Security Fund have been authorized to undertake a
program of compliance checks and audits. As in Iowa, audits are financed by the same
monies used to provide awards to clients. The trustees have experienced difficulties in
starting their program, because they have been unable to accumulate a sufficient amount in
the fund to begin compliance checks. Substantial defalcations, which might have been
detected early or deterred altogether if a compliance check program had been in operation,
have depleted the assets of the fund on several occasions and postponed the compliance
check pro~ram. Address by Edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Workshop
(Feb. 12, 1976).
Since 1962, Ontario has had a program of inspections involving "spot audits" which are
conducted on a random basis, "blitz audits" which cover all the la~..JJffices in a certain
geographical area, and comprehensive audits which result from client complaints about an
attorney's conduct. The audit staff includes five chartered accountants. While they concentrate on audits based upon complaints or suspicious circumstances, the auditors also
conduct over 30 "blitz" audits each month. Address by George H. Lockhead, Chairman,
Disciplinary Committee of the Law So~iety of Upper Canada, Board of Governors of the
State Bar of Wisconsin (Apr. 18, 1975); Letter from Robert Anderson to the author (Nov. 29,
1976).
165 In Ontario, it has been found that as a result of their extensive experience in conducting the cursory "blitz" and "sP9t" audits, the staff auditors have. become specialists in this
field. Hence, they require less direction than outside accountants and know where to look
for evidence of financial irregularities. Staff auditors are also more adept at preparing audit
reports which laymen can understand and are better witnesses at disciplinary hearings.
Letter from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977).
161

162

442

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:415

preliminary letter is sent to all attorneys in the county. The letter
informs the attorneys of approximately when the checks will occur
and reminds them that the checks are not the result of any complaints, but are conducted regularly on a random basis. By notifying the attorneys in the target area of the impending inspections,
the letter enables them to update their books. It also facilitates the
arrangement of appointments to conduct the audit at the attorney's
office. 166 Most importantly, such a letter to all area attorneys,
which reminds them that an audit may be triggered without probable cause, removes the stigma that might otherwise attach to an
attorney who is subjected to an audit by the disciplinary agency . 167
The actual compliance check investigation is relatively simple.
The auditor first ascertains whether adequate records 168 are being
kept. Then he inspects the account records, the check book, the
bank statements, the deposit slips, and the cancelled checks to
determine if there is any evidence of misappropriation. 169 If the
inspection reveals that there is reasonable cause to believe that a
defalcation has occurred, the auditor ceases his inspection to allow
the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation to conduct a complete
criminal inquiry . 170 Lesser forms of misconduct, such as inadequate recordkeeping, are usually reported to the commission
which operates the clients' security fund and inspection program,
and the commission contacts the attorney about correcting the
deficiencies. 171
Attorneys sometimes refuse to allow an auditor to inspect their
records, basing their objections either on a fifth amendment claim
of privilege from self-incrimination or on the need to preserve

IOWA AUDIT MANUAL, ·supra note 124, at 2.
Once subjected to an audit, an attorney may be informally stigmatizei, by his peers
even though his books and records are found to be in compliance with the requirements. By
using both compliance checks which are conducted on a random basis and regular audits
which are based on complaints, no suspicions of guilt are likely to arise from the fact that an
attorney has been audited. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 340."
168 Although Iowa has recommended the Delaware Guidelines to its attorneys, see notes
124-33 and accompanying text supra, it has only required the maintenance of records which
show the disbursements, the receipts, and the balance for each client. low A AUDIT MANUAL, supra note 124, at l, 2.
169 The Iowa Audit Manual sets out the principal steps for the auditor to follow:
Usually, the auditor will first examine the lawyer's trust account by reconciling the
ledgered client account balances with the trust account check book and bank
statement. He should make at least a cursory examination to make certain that
trust account checks are not being written to cover personal or business expenses
of the lawyer. If the bank statement reflects any overdrafts, an explanation is
required. If the clients' accounts reflect debit balances outstanding for any length
of time the auditor may ask for an explanation or ask to see the files .... In
addition, a review should be made of the general office receipts journal to see if
clients' funds are being improperly treated.
IowA AUDIT MANUAL, supra note 124, at l, 2.
170
Id. at 4.
166

167

1111d.
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confidential information concerning their clients. Given the present
state of the case law, it is unclear whether an attorney can legitimately assert the fifth amendment claim of privilege as the basis for
his refusal to release the records of his client trust account that he
is required by law or court rule to maintain. One state court has
held that the record requirements of DR 9-102, when adopted as a
court rule, come within the "required records" doctrine of Shapiro
v. United States 172 and must be produced for inspection by the
proper authorities. 173
In some states, where the confidential communications relate to
an attorney defalcation, a client privilege for the attorney to invoke
may not exist. 174 Some states take precautions to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of financial information about clients'
transactions 175 and provide safeguards to limit disclosure if the
records are used in disciplinary proceedings involving the attorney. 176 Apparently, the confidentiality objections of many attorneys are based less on a concern for their clients' privacy than on
their apprehension about a review of their records by a fellow

172
335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court held that because the records requested by investigating
authorities were required to be kept pursuant to federal regulation and were therefore
"public" in nature, a defendaflt could not withhold the records from an authorized agency
request based on his fifth amendment privilege.
173
Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 305 A.2d 845 (1973), cert. denied, 414 u:s. 1065
(1973). But see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 °(1967), where the Court held that the
imposition of discipline on an attorney, who refused to respond to inquiries into his
professional conduct on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him, violates the
attorney's constitutional rights.
174
In Wisconsin, for example, there is no client privilege as to a communication relating
to an attorney's·breach of his duty to his client. Wis. CT. R. § 905.03(4)(c). In Parry-Jones v.
Law Soc'y, 1 Ch. App. 1 (1967), the court stated:
The law implies a term into a contract whereby a professional man is to keep his
clients' affairs secret and not to disclose them to anyone without just cause ....
[But] the contract between solicitor and client must be taken to contain this
implication: the solicitor must obey the law, and, in particular, he must comply
with the rules made under the authority of statute for the conduct of the profession.
If the rules require him to disclose his client's affairs, then he must do so.
175
The proposed Wisconsin rules, for example, stipulate that the attorney's records will
not be disclosed except upon order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, or for use as evidence
in a disciplinary hearing if the attorney has failed to comply with DR 9-102. Disciplinary
agency personnel who make unauthorized disclosures of attorney records are subject to
punishment. Wisconsin Clients' Trust Funds Accounts Compliance Rules, Wisconsin B.
Bull. at 56 (Aug. 1976).
176
Florida, for example, makes the following provision for the protection of clients:
[N]otice of such intended use shall be given to any client involved, if practicable,
unless such client is already aware of such intended use, and upon good cause
shown by such client the admission of the same shall be under circumstances as
shall be reasonably calculated thereafter to protect the confidence of such client.
... Permissible_ means of protection shall not prejudice the respondent or accused
attorney, and may include but are not limited to excision, in camera production,
retention in sealed envelopes or similar devices.
INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule 1J.04(4)(c). See also CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6087, Rule 120.
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lawyer, especially if he is a competitor .177 Where an impartial
auditor conducts the investigation and there are safeguards against
unauthorized disclosure of the investigative finidings, few attorneys refuse to divulge information based on the attorney-client
relationship. 178
While a compliance check program is more controversial than
recordkeeping, certificate, or questionnaire requirements, 179 it fulfiiis severai professionai self-regulation objectives. A program of
compliance checks that is combined with a useful set of accounting
guidelines furnishes disorganized attorneys with the motivation
and the means to maintain adequate records, thus decreasing the
risk of "negligent" defalcations. 180 In addition, spot checks and
recordkeeping rules deter attorneys who may otherwise "borrow"
from their clients' funds. 181 Furthermore, with regard to the attorney who is not deterred, compliance checks may uncover defalcations before they involve substantial sums of money and numerous
clients. 182 As a result, the lawyer may still be financially able to
make restitution. Even if restitition is impossible, however, early
detection of the defalcation may minimize the client security fund
payments needed to reimburse the losses.
In additio!l to serving deterrent and enforcement functions, the
existing compliance check procedures also perform a guidance role
for the profession. Where advance notice is given of impending
compliance checks, an inspection can serve as an opportunity for
lawyers to become educated in proper trust accounting methods
and will alert them to their professional responsibilties in this
area. 183 In fact, auditors in Iowa and Ontario devote a substantial

1 77

Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Feb. IO, 1977).
Id.
179 A proposal for bookkeeping requirements, a certificate of compliance, l!,Ild audits or
compliance checks of the required records was considered recently by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association, but only the bookkeeping and certificate proposals were finally recommended
to the Supreme Court for promulgation as court rules. Interview with Carl E. Glock, Jr.,
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee which drafted the proposed rules (Oct. 14, 1976).
180 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 479 (1967).
181 Id.
182 Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Oct. 28, 1976). Defalcation by an attorney
often involves the funds of more than one client. For example, the Ontario Clients' Security
Fund, from its inception in 1953 until the end of 1976, has made awards to 958 clients on
account of only 104 former solicitors. Letter from Robert Anderson to .the author (Jan. 25,
1977).
183 IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, 1974 ANNUAL
REPORT 7
The Iowa Audit Procedures Manual closes with the reminder that "the vast majority of
lawyers are honest, but some are dilatory, and some do not keep sufficient records. Hence, a
part of the job of the auditor is to assist in educ&ting the lawyer." low A AUDIT MANUAL,
supra note 124, at 4.
118

SPRING
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amount of time to counseling and consulting with attorneys in
addition to their primary task of checking the adequacy of attorneys' financial records. 184 In this respect, compliance checks can
be conducted as part of a preventive program that has few grievance or disciplinary functions.

III.

CONCLUSION

In 1970, the Clark Report observed that the attitudes of attorneys
toward professional discipline ranged from apathy to active hostility .185 Frequently, reform of the self-regulatory mechanisms onhe
legal profession occurs only when outside forces threaten the professional privilege of self-discipline . 186 The misconceived notion
that self-regulation connotes only discipline and punishment is
partially responsible for the reluctance of the profession to improve
its self-regulatory system. The format of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly rejects such a limited conception of selfregulation. Admittedly, the Code contains Disciplinary Rules
which establish minimum standards for attorneys who seek. to
comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of the Code. However, the
Code also contains the aspirational Ethical Considerations that are
intended "for the 'good man,' as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of
professional conduct. " 187 Attorneys deserve the guidance and instruction that recordkeeping guidelines, certificates and questionnaires, and compliance checks provide. Clients' security funds, by
compensating for the losses of clients that the disciplinary proce-

184
Address by Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., Joint Meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on
Clients' Security Fund and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Aug. 4, 1973); letter
from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from John H. Neiman to the
author (Feb. 10, 1977). Mr. Neiman indicates in his letter that the Iowa auditors, when asked
for advice about effective auditing procedures, usually take a "soft pedal" approach,
suggesting possible approaches without any dogmatic assertions about a "single, correct"
way to keep accounts.
185
CLARK REPORT, supra note 25, at I.
186
The Clark Report warned that "[t]he profession does not have much time remaining to
reform its own disciplinary structure .... Public dissatisfaction is increasing .... We will
compound our own cure or someone else will mix up a dose that will curl our hair." CLARK
REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-9. Recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional
Discipline warned tht if the profession did not deal with the matter of the attorney discipline
system in federal courts, Congress may authorize the U.S. attorneys, who are also courtroom adversaries of the private bar, to take over discipline enforcement in the federal
courts. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1977, at 5, col. I.
187
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974).
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dures failed to deter, have complemented the traditional efforts at
self-regulation. Unlike the new procedures, however, the effects of
the funds are strictly remedial and not preventive. Acceptance and
implementation of the emerging preventive procedures should
demonstrate that effective self-regulation can protect both clients
and attorneys without necessarily increasing the use of disciplinary
sanctions.
---G-regory Dunbar Soule

